Tides of Numenera

Update from 2018: Despite it may seem I didn’t like this game even just this blog post means that actually it was one of the few games that actually impressed me in every meaning of the word. I casually revisit it by time to time and I recommend at least trying it out. A second playthrough may be a bit better, mostly because of the issues I mentioned in this very post. The only serious problem with this game is that it was advertised alongside Planescape Torment while there are several huge difference between them and expecting similarity leads to disappointment.

Numenera starts a bit overwhelming, maybe because I didn’t follow the kickstarter itself and I’m not familiar with the Monte Cook world of Numenera. The first hours were pretty much smelling a flower and having a hard time deciding if it’s an aromatic odor or just something rotten to the core, assaulting your nose.

After a while it certainly matures into something great with very common literary devices (since Pillars of Eternity so I definitely recommend not playing that before Torment) and a story that is kind of difficult not to tell spoilers of when writing about it. I’ll try to keep it to events and parts you would find out at the very start anyway, because you have plenty of information right away.

The main story revolves around you being a human body, a mere vessel of someone called the Changing God. This character mostly starts out as an archetype of the idea of a monotheistic God, sometimes described as cruel or all-merciful but overall it’s very difficult to form an encompassing view of them. As the story unfolds, it becomes clear that this mythical figure is more human than anyone else, a Homo Deus excellence – the man-made god itself.

The main point of the story will be to make up your mind about the idea of their godhood, their self-made immortality and how to judge their (and also your own) actions. This is why the story works so well – even though you have limited options, and they force views on you it still doesn’t feel like that. While wandering the world talking to the non-player characters you have a lot of time to form your own opinion even if the game itself limits them into strict categories a lot of the times. Still feels like that you are free to make up your own mind, even if it’s just an illusion.

Let’s face it though, a video game can’t really do it much better, this is pretty much the best such a medium can go these times. While at tabletop sessions you have the storyteller (or dungeon master in some systems) to form the story for your decisions, a software should become creative to have a qualitative step over the current roleplaying games – something that softwares won’t be capable of for a long time, even though it’s just my own opinion and up for debate.

Another serious aspect of the game is that you can solve almost every single encounter without using force and violence, that seems like a good idea but given the world and realistic problems in Numenera, easily becomes silly a lot of the time. A common solution is to frighten and intimidate others, persuading them that you are tougher than you look – something you can be succesful at even against like 8-10 fanatic cultists and such enemies.

As I mostly had the Gold/Blue tides dominant on my character it certainly wasn’t an issue for me that besides “boss fights” you can always talk your way out, as it made a lot of sense to my character’s approach but in some situations it really led to awkward dialogues and silly situations that broke the illusion of the story for me. On another note, it worths mentioning: leaving certain main areas result in instantly failing any uncompleted quests, you can’t go back after leaving certain points.

The world is very strange because it doesn’t really feel like sci-fi but it’s not fantasy either, the thing is that the devices you encounter are never really explained well – I mean their inner workings and such. Just as a common example, every mention of consciousness could be just as easily replaced with the term soul. This kills the science vibe as every technology and machine is reduced into magic, while their presence is so dominant that some scenes are closer to a Shadowrun world than Middle-Earth. If I would need to summarize the world of Numenera then it would be a strange alloy of Mage The Awakening and Planescape, like in the ratio of 30-70 or so.

To be fair, considering how alien the structures and devices are in the world it would be very challenging to “harden” it from soft science-fiction to something more plausible, because we have all the technology here that are the rage these days like mind uploading, matrix-like simulations, time travel, artificial intelligence and large size quantum effects. These are all made into literary devices and other than their effects and how do they feel to use, they are never explained or described as potential scientific breakthroughs. Then again, this could be a conscious choice of the world builders, because for example the numenera cyphers are supposed to be mysterious, and detailing their workings would kill some of the vibe.

I completed most of the game with Rhin only , because the other characters didn’t seem memorable enough. This was pretty much a problem for me all the time with lot of characters in the game, that their stories and problems are interesting and fascinating as they have real moral problems and disputes but the characters themselves are not really interesting. I couldn’t even recall too much of them I’ve met in the game, that could be some problem with my memory for sure. Though if you consider how do they talk to you, like how the psychics don’t even take themselves seriously while discussing the nature of perception – it just becomes a mess of stories and you dont really grow attached to most of them, at least I couldn’t.

Sometimes even the merecaster characters were more memorable than the met companions or main story ones, that could be the problem of inconsistent writing process – I mean check the development information and see for yourself that there were more than 10 writers involved that surely makes a very wide variety of quality and moods involved. Trust me I wasn’t rushing the game through yet it took 21 hours to complete that is decent for someone like me who doesn’t have that much time to play any more, but still counts as kind of short compared to the 30-40 hours average of a Baldur’s Gate game.

Even the mere notion of writing this post means that the game is really good and I don’t think that I’ve played a rpg in the last decade that was this interesting, even with all the bitter taste involved that some parts left in my mind.

Though I encountered game breaking bugs while playing (one time the game was stuck at a certain point after finishing a dialogue so I had to kill it from the task manager, and another time I did something in the wrong order so failed to complete a pretty much important quest with no chance to redo it) I didn’t mention those, because I got the 1.0.1 version and they may have fixed these already.


Introduction to a computational worldview


Update: The youtube account that uploaded the video was terminated so I included a link to the original website even with an option to download the video itself.

The 33th Chaos Computer Conference has ended and one of the talks was a really nice introduction to the computational worldview that is gaining more and more support since Putnam formalized the foundations in the 60s. It is extraordinary as it touches all the crucial points where you can either agree or disagree, mentioning the specific theories being used to support the presented views.

The presentation itself is called “Dreaming Machines” and while being utterly interesting it fails to make the connection between computationalism and phenomena, actually even at 37:45 the presenter (Joscha) admits the lack of answers.


When will be the world understood?

I can’t sleep again. If you don’t know history, you are doomed to repeat it. My diary reads mostly like any text by Berkeley even though 300 years have passed. Is understanding inherently mathematical? One of the things scientism showed me, is that the mere notion of the world as a problem can be very misleading. On a Sartrean notion, we are completely free to make up our categories. This is a great example: the world doesn’t necessarily present itself as a problem to be solved. A difficulty with this view of the world is that the solution would be part of the world, and so the problem itself as well. Is there even a state of the world when it could be called solved if we view all the possible configurations as part of some universal state space? When does a theory end? Must the end of a theory be found within the theory of ends, seeking eradication of itself?

In physics, understanding something means finding mathematical analogy to get right (like fitting into the Standard Model) calculations, in short understanding means to calculate – that fits with the common view of intelligence as optimization.  The problem really gets emphasized by recalling the problem of dark matter and dark energy. We can say that science roughly works in the phase of normal science (Kuhnian terminology) at the current era, and I assume there is an epistemological gap between different phases of scientific works. (These phases are probably ideologized, and there could be overlaps between them). Understanding something starts with considering something a problem on both psychological and philosophical level. So how do we understand the world?

When we proceed to understand dark matter and dark energy, do we need to alter the theory of gravity, the theory of dark matter itself, or is it a mathematical problem only? How do we decide? Let’s say in advance that this is not about my view of physics, I will mostly think about the differences between these attitudes while the actual and practical solution is always in the domain of physics itself. With attitude I mainly mean the problem of science as an universal solution that is pretty much an ongoing debate heated up mostly by Feyerabend. Is there a single scientific method you can isolate or only scientific methods with little in common?

Whenever we apply a mathematical apparatus onto certain arguments, it’s clear that the equations themselves are indifferent to their inputs and we can only decide if they are “right” when they are consistent within a system or theory. I really think that the search for a priori principles is not even near to being finished (this is basically The Kantian project itself), because mathematical truths work within their corresponding frameworks only (that makes them a great example of the coherence theory of truth). What is understanding then? If it’s not algorithmic, then it must lie within the framework itself and we could just as well say it’s a matter of perspective. The full understanding may come with both framework and algorithmic part, but the fundamental parts are the essential ones – and it’s not in the algorithms. Why?

Maybe Scott Aaronson framed it the best about the problem of complexity in “Reasons to believe“:

“If P = NP, then the world would be a profoundly different place than we usually assume it to be. There would be no special value in “creative leaps,” no fundamental gap between solving a problem and recognizing the solution once it’s found. Everyone who could appreciate a symphony would be Mozart; everyone who could follow a step-by-step argument would be Gauss; everyone who could recognize a good investment strategy would be Warren Buffett.”

Even with mathematics getting more and more abstract, including more and more previously metamathematical questions into it’s framework (see Type Theory), the main questions remain the same. Why do some analogies work while others don’t? Which part of a framework is fundamental for understanding? Where does the “meaning” of everything comes from? But as I used to frame the question: how do we understand the world?

This was not just my weird dream and strange categorization. The so-called theory of everything is about this exact problem, a very fashionable problem these days that is kind of strange in a post-Gödelian scientific community. If everything is calculations, that is not more meaningful than saying that everything is in some kind of space.

As it is very imminently grasped after reading a very good summary of the related problem in a paper from 1959, the problem is mostly shadowed by our presuppositions. The mind is not an universal intelligence either, you are always bounded by a framework and as I wrote about it earlier I don’t think that the classical category of consciousness is very helpful to present these questions either. Viewing the world as a problem leads to infinite regression and other known problems that can’t be solved within the given bounds. The biological mind may be different, but it is nowhere universal either, and to solve the universe as a problem you would need an universal intelligence that is probably one of the most paradoxical things one can think of.


Ricoh SP-150


It was quite an adventure, even though looking back, it should have been easy to get this printer to work, knowing that there is supposed to be official support for linux. If you are puzzled on how to get it to work, first visit this website. I’m on Parabola that is basically Arch Linux but contains free software only.

The listed entries are all self extracting .exe files so you can’t avoid using either a windows box or maybe cabextract. I extracted them on a borrowed laptop, and got a .deb file for ubuntu. You can extract deb files via the following method:

ar vx RICOH-SP-150_1.0-22_amd64.deb
tar -xzvf data.tar.gz

You won’t need any more parts, as this yield all the contents for a CUPS installation, we end up having an /opt/ and /usr/ and such folders with the appropriate .ppd and .app files. The very core of what you need are the following ones, copy them to their place with:

sudo mkdir -p /opt/RICOH/lib
sudo cp opt/RICOH/lib/RICOH\ SP\ 150cl.so /opt/RICOH/lib/
sudo cp usr/lib/cups/filter/RICOH_SP_150Filter.app usr/lib/cups/filter/

The file “RICOH SP 150.ppd” is needed on the CUPS page you can access with:


That part is pretty straightforward, my printer is shared over the network with a router, so I added it via AppSocket/HP JetDirect protocol, using my routers address, and on the second page you will need to upload the .ppd file. The test page from CUPS didn’t work but I can use it without any problems from my PDF reader or browser.

Update: I had an issue with Iceweasel not seeing any printer, so first I tried:

strace iceweasel 2>&1 | grep "print"
sudo pacman -Sy gtk3-print-backends
sudo ln -s /usr/lib/gtk-3.0/3.0.0/printbackends/ /usr/lib/gtk-3.0/3.0.0/x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu/

Then iceweasel started showing up my printer but it doesn’t actually print anything even though the Ricoh starts to heat up. I managed to print some pages so far, but it seems kind of random. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn’t. Not sure yet about the why.


Robin Le Poidevin: Változás, ok és ellentmondás (magyar fordítás)

Update: On 2018/03/26 I got a response from the publisher that I’m not allowed to host this translation so I may work on it in the future but won’t upload the book here.

Eredetileg ez a poszt angolul volt, de végül úgy döntöttem egy magyar fordításhoz írok azért magyarul is. Szabadidőmben 2016. októbere környékén elkezdtem fordítani Poidevin “Change, cause and contradiction” című könyvét, mely a “Változás, ok és ellentmondás” címet kapta. Jelenleg nagyjából 7 fejezettel vagyok készen, és mivel ez csupán szabadidős projekt ezért a saját szájízem szerint fordítok ami azt jelenti, hogy a használt kifejezések helyenként nagyon eltérhetnek a bevett terminológiától. A dokumentum végén mindig van fordítási szószedet az eligazodáshoz, ezt eredetileg itt a posztban kívántam közölni de megtekinthető a fordítás után.

Úgy érzem megengedhetem magamnak azt, hogy ha kifejezőbbnek érzek egy adott fordítást, akkor úgy használom. A tenseless theory lehetne “igeidőtlen elmélet” is, de az izotrópia – anizotrópia dichotómiája az időtípusok hierarchiájára és ezáltal az elmélet struktúrájára irányítja a figyelmet, ami sokkal fontosabb mint maga a nyelvtani igeidő. A valódi különbség tenseless és tensed elmélet között nem a nyelv szintjén keresendő, így a nyelvi elemekről elnevezni őket nem látszott helyesnek számomra. Minden fordítás persze értelmezés is, így aki valamilyen okból visszataszítónak találja az értékítéleteimet ezen állásfoglalások felett, az mindenképpen a szöveg eredetijéhez kell, hogy forduljon.

I started translating this book in my spare time, even though it’s really tough without the proper glossary of hungarian. I’m not aware of any widespread translations (I must admit thought I very rarely read such text in my native) of such like tensed theory, so because it’s just a hobby project I was brave enough to use untraditional terms for the related ideas. There will be a translation glossary included, so I don’t list the translated terms in this blog post any more.

Gifford seems to be some kind of lecture series on St. Andreas university, so I didn’t change that. You can see a preview here, though it’s full of parts with hasty and temporary translations.

Update: I will probably migrate the whole document into latex to properly render the modal formulas but the current tex version is just an unfinished example.


Hinoki 2.0

I’ve seen this performance in Trafó tonight, and it was well worth my time. The following description and opinion is highly personal of course.

Ever since I’ve grown tired of the theater plays usually available in my city I started visiting dance related performances and ballet as well, seemingly it suits my taste much better. I’m kind of amazed by the wide and open space of interpretation that is offered by something that completely lacks vocal grammar and language. It’s certainly not without problems especially for someone quite new to the whole genre, because we are full of preconceptions brought from language and they don’t work in the inferential area of music and movement. Language is a very rigid structure compared to the nonverbal reality laying beyond words and conscious thoughts. If theater is philosophy then dance is psychology.

To me it was surprising that Hinoki was presented with live music of an acoustic drum kit, some kind of a stratocaster guitar and a BOSS RC-50 looper multi-effect pedal. On my way out I think I also spotted a TE OP-1 but I’m not entirely sure. Most of the music was done by drumming not on the kit only but on the guitar also and applying various looping methods and tape delay, reverse echo with other various sound effects. At one point there was even a bow involved, and just as I was thinking at the start that I’d be afraid of ground or feedback loops occurring while using such an equipment, once it seemed to happen but Áron solved it very fast. Or was it intentional? It doesn’t even matter, to be perfectly honest.

Do you remember being born? It’s most probably a very rude awakening, the world being overwhelming and burning with noise and light you need a lot of time getting used to. This is exactly how Hinoki felt in the first few minutes, like an explosion in your mind ripping it apart. There’s nothing to fear though, as the slow recollection of your pieces and the categorization of the world begins and you are used to being there, even if it takes some effort.

Before I go on I must admit it, that I was mildly uncomfortable during the whole hour, because of the live act in the left corner. I couldn’t help myself but keeping checking back to the drummer and guitarist, kind of breaking the whole experience every single time. Honestly, I couldn’t focus perfectly even though the lights were dim on him, the musician was still very noticeable and I think the principle of “less is more” could have been very fitting to Hinoki in this regard. Don’t get me wrong, the live music was a very very strong point but not hiding the instruments is something I must complain about a little bit. It may have been just me, who knows? But anyway with a bit different lighting, the stage could have been rid of the spot in the corner that kept diverting my attention all the time.

The figures on the stage very often do a full cycle of resting and waking, then getting dirty from being alive, fighting and forming pairs then getting dissolved in the shadows once again. Most of the time there were 5 or 3 dancers active that made the whole performance kind of asymmetric by default. You can feel that the whole “story” is mostly about the feel of being broken. There are so many ways to break, and there is not a single way to interpret this word as it can refer to some kind of disorder, introducing something whole into the picture, it can mean some kind of loss but the parts not fitting anywhere can be considered broken as well.

I wonder if it really worths analyzing these experiences after a certain point. Indeed when someone makes a choreography and you are watching it being presented then one is tempted to say they were translating something to a language that I also need to translate into a third language but as there is no language involved, I really doubt that this is the correct way of phrasing what is really happening. Somehow movement escapes language entirely and building up an entire story just to interpret seems like a poor way of framing what is really happening on the stage.

Seems to me that the most authentic description and interpretation would be just writing down some kind of script of all the happenings, because all of us know the meaning – even without words – of being on the ground, getting close to someone, ducking in a fist fight or stepping and moving in the black fragments of something that becomes a part of us by contact, even if just for a certain time like everything else. The world becomes nothing but a mess full of births and deaths even if we don’t view it like that usually after the one hour of Hinoki is over.


Notes about a comment on “Kantian space”

“How did Kantians in the 1800s and afterward address non-Euclidean Geometry? I have strong issues with Kant’s reasoning, since it implicitly relies on the assumption that Euclidean Geometry is the fundamental basis of spatial reasoning, where triangles inherently must all have angles which sum to 180 degrees. In non-Euclidean Geometry, there are triangles which ARE triangles yet do not have angle sums equal to 180 degrees. Same with mathematical reasoning of 5+7=12, which assumes Base 10 and some underlying logic axioms, but does not apply, say, to other number bases such as Base 9, or to clouds (5 clouds + 7 clouds may combine into 1 cloud). Did Kantians address these assumptions of Kant versus later mathematical developments? Your suggestion that it is about the structure of geometry goes to Kant’s thinking and other philosophers’ thinking that you only need logic and some structural reasoning to reach universal truths. But logic and reasoning are flawed due to their implicit assumptions, such as focusing on one type of geometry or counting system as opposed to other types. When one considers the possibility that 5+7 does not always equal 12 (unless one lays out, in detail, the implicit assumptions being used), one should see that Kant’s arguments are flawed.”

(Edit: Should have started the whole post with “In my opinion:”) The particular geometry of Euclid is just an example, the Kantian arguments are not about specific geometries but rather about the structure of any kind of geometry itself, so it doesn’t rely on those assumptions. It can be understood just as abstract as the notion of space evolved over time in linear algebra and physics. Even if we don’t count specific properties of fields, rings and spaces, there is always an idea of “in-ness” and you can’t get rid of it this easily by mentioning non-euclidean geometry. It was hinted in the comment, that every system is “flawed” by having a perspective, because their truths are inherently bound by the frames of that given system. Maybe I’m defending the coherence theory of truth way too much here, but the comment itself presupposes a similar theory of truth, so I’m trying to reply in the same frame of reference. This is not an universal truth, at least we don’t know from just this, may be just a human bias even, this really depends on your further views.

The thing is, that we are talking about geometries and a priori principles, not about some universal truth (that seems like a quite strange idea in itself). What the a priori notion of space means, is that there is something general about them (all of spaces, any space), and it is the same generalization that mathematics is formalizing by discovering all the possible spaces and relations in them.  (Type theory should be especially interesting for philosophy.)
Kant’s examples may be outdated, but the arguments themselves are not affected by that because there is some kind of “space-ness” in everything we think about, it’s not just a semantical problem of using phrases like “in my head” or “out of question”. My personal opinion is that the categories of a priori and a posteriori would need a rework themselves but there is still a sharp distinction between at least two types of ideas. (Here’s an analogy within set theories, you could think of sets as a priori and relations or attributes like being well-ordered as a posteriori.) The very  crucial nature of space is certainly mysterious, but nevertheless it seems to be a fundamental “base” to interpret, imagine or understand anything at all. I think an interesting addition is how modern physics seems to be in agreement with this view in a way, because according to the current models where there is anything (forces), there is space as well. Could it be any other way?

The Simulation Argument

I found these thoughts about the issue on another webpage, although much clearly. For a better explanation of this critique you can visit this website by Brian Eggleston. A better summary would be: “[…] the expectation that he assigns to the number of simulated people is not independent of the prior probability of the existence of other worlds.”

It is clear that Bostrom’s argument is mainly about probabilities, and honestly I love it a lot. As the probability of a post-human civilization capable of running ancestor simulations goes up, and their resources are supposedly let them to run as much of these as they are capable of, your probability of living in such a world is increasing as well.

Why? If you try to imagine all the possible worlds, and pick out the ones that are simulated by a post-human civilization, it’s rather clear that the more they run, the more part of the possible worlds are taken by these simulations (in the original argument it’s actually 1 host + n simulations). Yet I think it’s a pretty premature scenario to consider, given we can’t measure the number of all the possible worlds. Given a big enough (expanding to be sure) universe, as the post-human civilizations’ numbers and their resource management capabilities are increasing, exponentially increase the number of simulations as well.

Yet I impose that just by dropping the “ancestor” part of Bostrom’s argument, it becomes about a slightly different problem completely enclosing the original argument itself. The simulation argument is really about multi-verses (or possible worlds) and nested simulations (or simulations within simulations, their running time and resource usage).

The real problem is that we don’t know how many universes are possible, and we don’t know how big even our own universe is. Whatever enormous number someone thinks of, there is always a bigger number in theory. In reality, how could we measure all the possible universes? Without that information though the simulation argument  fails to hold of to prove (as with logical necessity prove) our simulated reality, because it is certainly a possible case that we may be even the very first civilization capable of such a thing. Highly unlikely given the assumptions of Bostrom? Sure. Impossible? Not the least amount.

To get a bit more technical, you always give probabilities in the ratio of examined case/all cases. So to get a formula such as in the original paper from 2003, you need to give something like Nsw/Naw where Nsw is the number of simulated worlds, Naw is the number of all possible worlds, that is not simulation by any civilization capable of running such a universe simulation. Let me quote this part in his paper.


“[…] we can then see that at least one of the following three propositions must be true.” Meaning the three propositions above. What is really important is seeing how Bostrom claimed to give the probability that will always be around 0.9 probability unless there are no civilizations either capable of or interested in running such an ancestor simulation. (Exactly the three propositions above.) This is because the original argument only consider a single possible world, where you are either in the host universe or within any of the running simulations. Given this environment your chance is clearly as little as 1% if most of the premises are true (and what gives weight to the whole paper is that all of the considered scenarios about consciousness, post-human civilizations’ capabilities, etc. are quite likely).

Bostrom only counts with a single possible universe, that has simulations running in them, and asks what are the chances we are not in a simulation within a host universe given the high probability of a post-human civilization capable of running intensive amount of simulations. You can clearly see a problem for yourself if you consider the scenario of simulations within simulations, as a first step asking what are the chances that the mother/host/original/non-simulated universe is simulated itself? (I’ll probably go by the name host universe.)

As you go deeper within the simulation chain, will the probability of a possible world being a simulation rise or will it go lower? It will rise, and the chance of being in the host universe will be infinitely small within just a few thousands of steps. Because of all the cases there is only one being non-simulated. Even if you accept the only one possible world view, you need to know if there are any simulated universe within the simulated universes, to know the probabilities for sure. However if you accept the view that there could be multi-verses, then with 5 host universe and 5 simulation, the probability becomes 5/10 to be within a non-simulated environment. Unless we assume infinite energy, keeping the simulations at least equally quantized/precise/complex will also give exponential rise to resource usage that leads to the question if these would be run only until a certain technological stage before the simulated ancestor can develop their own simulations or are they run indefinitely? The first and more likely case also limits their number, this is also most probably why Bostrom considers ancestor simulations instead of simulations in general. It is clear that his argument doesn’t work in a retro-causal way – if you are not in a simulation now, then the future possibilities of civilizations running such won’t affect your universe.

You really don’t need to consider multi-verses to see my point. How big is our universe, do we even know? How many possible civilizations could be there that are already running such simulations? Even with a single possible universe, we can classify therefore civilizations into two eras: pre-simulation and post-simulation, the latter being capable of running an ancestor simulation. If the number of ancestor simulations are indeed that high as Bostrom claims so, then the number of post-simulation civilizations number must get lower as well. As the number of universe simulations get higher, the possible number of post-simulation civilizations go down. We are talking about such an immense resource and processing power that it’s difficult to see for sure, but if we can hypothesize that such a computing power is even possible to simulate such a structure as our reality, then it’s equally dubious that these simulations would be run indefinitely.

What are we really talking about is the size of these host or simulated universes. To our best knowledge, our universe is expanding. If we consider this as resource usage for a simulated environment, the host universe must expand and/or keep up with the fast increasing computation demand of such an universe as well, and with the physical limits of computation in mind, even if the limits are hard to understand with a human mind, they exist and very real. If you consider the host universe having very different physics, then we are not very far away from the possibility of multi-verses either.

Why is this multi-verse thing important? The human mind is very bad with numbers in general and especially with big numbers, but let’s assume we have 1000 simulations for every world and we have 5 possible worlds. We already have 5/5000 chance to be in a non-simulated environment. With 50 possible worlds and 10000 simulations it’s 50/50000, and so on. The number of simulations will be always limited within a single universe, as resource is very likely to be finite especially considering the physical limits of computation, the number of possible worlds is very difficult to evaluate. What are crucial to consider for a better understanding of Bostrom’s argument are:

  1. the uptime of simulations,
  2. the resource (computing) limitations of universes,
  3. the number of possible worlds (multi-verses)
  4. physical limits of computation (Landauer’s principle, etc.)

All these simulation arguments change nothing but reinvent theology in an algorithmic concept, and such a world view will eventually face the same ages old issues if they really go by their theory. If I remember well, even when The Matrix came out, people were already talking about how it is related to the indian Brahman concept and such. See also the 9th question here.




Sometimes I think it’s more of a tormenting prison of thoughts. I don’t think because I want to, I think because I can’t stop thinking. Some problems are so burning and so important that I can’t stop thinking about them again and again. It’s half past 4 am.

One of the most problematic part of thinking is that you can’t have a consistent theory and opinion of such fundamental ideas as change or causality without also defining connected terms like minds or time. Reality is such a network of ideas, a map or a net of all thoughts that we can’t have singular and consistent ideas without context (by definition of consistency, actually). The right question is usually not “what is possible” but consider a solving method of the famous sudoku puzzles. By logical means we filter out the not-possible and then relations between the remaining possible solutions will eventually narrow down into reality (a solution in this case). This works out if enough parameters are given, what is maybe not the case in our human existence.

Lately I was reading up about tenseless theory of time, and especially after special relativity and recognizing the matter of light as an information source I don’t see why would a tensed theory be reasonable. I’d say that we are not spatial bodies or beings but tempo-spatial beings, our bodies extending in both spatial and temporal dimensions. Just as I doubt the consistency of the idea of a single consciousness, I also doubt the consistency of a single present moment we live in. Just as the mind can be a society (in Minskian terms), our present can be a “society of moments” as well. Whenever we consider present as a single moment, we need to ask (especially in a post-Einsteinian world) that whose present moment are we talking about? With properly fine quantization in mind, we need to consider which sense input or which part of our bodies we want to locate our present moment at.

Why don’t I have memories of my temporal body’s “future” parts?  We are such a thin slice of this temporal and spatial being, that some of our “very early” parts are not memories of us but memories of others. It could be the case that my memory of the future parts of my temporal body is actually my “current” thoughts and decisions.

Why am I this particular slice of this spatial-temporal body? Certain parts of reality is given like a seed of a generated world, this is also called the anthropic principle. There is no viewpoint without a point (a frame of reference), and although I think the subjectivity-objectivity distinction is fundamentally wrong, you could consider my opinion stating that “every viewpoint is a subjective viewpoint”, as objectivity is really just a pursuit to be compatible with every (subjective) views. This may sound strange, as compatibility usually have the connotations of something that extends the possibilities, but it really narrows down the options throughout all the possible views. I think the method of how we make up objectivity is the same as the B->A reduction of the series of time.


35 types of sadness

There is a sadness for every step, for every change.

There is the sadness of being less,
the weak plea and cry of of a worm.
There is the sadness of being too much,
the overflooding mourn of the Sun.
There is the sadness of the mirror,
being imprisoned in an epiphany.

There is the sadness of the flesh,
hammered into ashes by time.
There is the sadness of the blood,
kissing the walls that never say a word.
There is the sadness of the bone,
chiseled into twigs by the weight.

There is the sadness of the lust,
as the burning sheets are turning cold again.
There is the sadness of the child,
leaving the womb in a pool of tears.
There is the sadness of the man,
leaving dull and empty homes behind.
There is the sadness of the father,
as his own seed is choking his soul.

There is the sadness of life,
every stories coming to the same end.
There is the sadness of death,
being afraid of taking the first step.

There is the sadness of the forest,
dissolving in others’ bodies.
There is the sadness of the book,
always needing a reader.
There is the sadness of the king,
giving away yourself to be something more.
There is the sadness of the mother,
giving away yourself to be something less.

There is the sadness of the door,
never being space but boundary.
There is the sadness of the quill,
frozen in the eternal search of a goal.
There is the sadness of the key,
who can’t leave it’s lock behind.
There is the sadness of the paper,
imagining power it never really had.

There is the sadness of the road,
not having knowledge of it’s own length.
There is the sadness of the hand,
overwhelmed by all the work.
There is the sadness of the eyes,
overwhelmed by all the beauty.

There is the sadness of the bird,
reflecting on the illusion of freedom.
There is the sadness of the trees,
enduring pain until the very last moment.

There is the sadness of the sleep,
escaping into a shroud of one’s own mind.
There is the sadness of the morning,
irreversible rays of burning light.
There is the sadness of the night,
buried feelings burning under skin of a statue.
There is the sadness of the present,
grain of sand fleeting all the net of thin fingers.

There is the sadness of the flower,
feeling the grip of winter in the air.
There is the sadness of the hunger,
always on the move to the next meal.
There is the sadness of the water,
even the smallest peck of dust causing a ripple.
There is the sadness of the iron,
only being able to change through storms of flames.

There is the sadness of the healer,
fighting inevitable rot like Sisyphus of the body.
There is the sadness of the poet,
inspiring others though writing in the mud.